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THE "BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD": IS A
CATEGORICAL BAN ON HOMOSEXUAL
ADOPTION AN APPROPRIATE MEANS TO THIS
END?
"'To be happy at home is the ultimate result of all ambition, the
end to which every enterprise and labour tends, and of which
every desire prompts the prosecution."' 1
I. INTRODUCTION
For most, happiness is a lifelong aspiration. This is especially true
for those children who are, for whatever reason, denied the benefit of a
loving parent. For a child in need of a family, a safe, loving, and happy
home is the ultimate goal. However, just as there is no perfect equation
with which to obtain a flawless decision in most areas of the law, the
"best interest of the child" standard is no exception in cases of child
placement. This standard is typically applied in situations concerning
child custody in the event of a divorce, termination of parental rights
proceedings when a parent is physically or psychologically putting the
child in jeopardy, foster care placement, and when a petition for
adoptive placement is filed.!
While the practice of adopting children has been in existence for
centuries,3 within the American forum different forms of adoption are
emerging at an exceedingly rapid pace.' One of these emerging forms is
adoption by homosexuals. This Comment will address a number of
1. MARGARET KORNITZER, CHILD ADOPTION IN THE MODERN WORLD 123 (1952)
(quoting Doctor Samuel Johnson, original source unknown).
2. See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1996).
3. See MORTON L. LEAVY, LAWv OF ADOPTION 1 (1968). Massachusetts first codified
the American adoption process in 1851. See id
4. See generally CHRISTINE ADAMEC & WILLIAM L. PIERCE, PH.D., THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ADOPTION (1991). With the ever changing model of the American
family, hand-in-hand come many variations of what has historically been known as the
traditional adoption. By "traditional adoption" I am referring to a situation involving a
married couple who wishes to adopt an infant child. While this connotation may still be that
this is "traditional," in today's society, an adoption performed under these circumstances is
probably the least common. Today, adoptions include people of all races, heritages, ages, and
sexual orientations. These variations include multi-racial/cultural adoption, adult adoption,
step-parent adoption, gay and lesbian adoption, and also second-parent adoption, which is a
form of gay or lesbian adoption. See id
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issues central to adoption by homosexuals. First, this Comment will give
a brief overview of the evolution of adoption and how it has progressed
within the American culture-looking specifically at the ends it has
sought, and still seeks to achieve. Second, this Comment will analyze
the purported constitutionality of state statutes that expressly prohibit
adoption by homosexuals Third, this Comment will contrast this
purported constitutionality with caselaw that supports adoption by
6homosexuals and some of the theories behind these decisions. In
conclusion, this Comment will argue for implementation of the "best
interest of the child" standard as the quintessential determinant with
regard to adoptive placement-considering the sexual orientation of the
adoptive parent only when there is another prospective adoptive parent.
II. ADOPTION LAW AND ITS HISTORY
The institution of adoption is not a brainchild of twentieth century
America's legal system as many would imagine, but is a tradition dating
back over 4,000 years to as early as the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi
in 2285 B.C.7 However ancient its origin, the foundation on which most
western societies base their adoption law is the original Roman Code or
the later Napoleonic Code.8
While the text, and the ultimate result, of today's adoption laws may
bear a striking similarity to the laws of those who have preceded us, the
goals of early adoption law are quite dissimilar to the interests sought by
5. See State Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1215-1220
(Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that statute prohibiting homosexual adoption did not
violate plaintiffs constitutional right to equal protection, right to privacy or due process),
review granted, 637 So. 2d 234, approved in part, quashed in part, 656 So. 2d 902, reh'g denied
(July 5, 1995); In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 26 (N.H. 1987) (holding, in response
to question posed by the legislature, that proposed bill prohibiting homosexuals from
adoption would not violate any substantive right under the state or federal constitutions).
6. See In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995); In re Adoption of Tammy, 619
N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); In re Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1993); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995); In re Adoption of Caitlin, 622
N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1994); In re Adoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio
1990).
7. See ADAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 4, at xvii. An even earlier reference to adoption
is in the Bible wherein a description is given of the adoption of Moses by the Pharaoh's
daughter. See id.; 2 Exodus 1:10.
8. See ADAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 4, at xviii. It is agreed upon by most experts that
American adoption law is a combination of aspects of Roman law and American adaptations.
See id.
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the present institution.9 At its inception, the primary goals of adoption
were to benefit society as a whole,"0 and more importantly, to provide an
heir for the adopting parent or parents." Without the aid of today's
endless list of infertility alternatives, would-be mothers and fathers
looked to adoption as a viable solution. As such, prospective parents
were quite meticulous when choosing which child to adopt in that he or
she would serve as the sole heir to the family estate. It was considered
most desirous to find a child that was an aesthetic match to the adoptive
family.1
2
In the early 1950s, American society began warming up to the idea
of adopting infants 3 for reasons other than gaining an heir or additional
laborer. 4 Before the 1954 Supreme Court decision of Brown v. Board
of Education," however, minority children were virtually excluded from
mainstream charities that were instrumental in adoption placement.
Then, with the civil rights movement of the 1960s, the children of the
political and racial minorities in need of homes finally began to receive
well deserved recognition by child welfare services. 7
Notwithstanding the integration of minorities into the child welfare
system, a significant bias still existed. Through the 1970s "most
adoption agencies and adoption intermediaries, such as attorneys or
physicians, concentrated on placing healthy white infants with adoptive
9. See id. at xvii. Early on, the needs of society and the needs of the family were the
motivating factors behind the institutionalization of adoption. See id. Today, however, "the
needs and interests of the child are usually considered the primary reason and purpose for
adoption as an institution." Id.
10. The "common denominator" among worldwide cultures for the institutionalization
of adoption was that it would serve the needs of society and the family. See id. at xvii.
Though the adoption also generally benefited the adoptee, "such benefit was peripheral and
was generally a happy accident." Md
11. See LEAVY, supra note 3 at 1.
12. See ADAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 4, at xxvii. From the 1950s to the 1970s
facilitators of the adoption process concentrated primarily on the placement of white infants
with white families. See id Little attention was paid to black orphans, or other ethnic
minority children in need of adoptive or foster placement. See id.
13. See id. "In 1951, an estimated 70% of the children adopted in 21 states were under
the age of one year. Unwed mothers were urged or pressured to choose adoption over single
parenthood." Id.
14. See id. After passage of the child labor laws, by the late 1930s, the motivation to
adopt children shifted from that of a need for an extra hand to "a desire to become a loving
parent." Id.
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. See ADAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 4, at xxviii.
17. See id.
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families."18 As such, minority children remained underrepresented in
the class of adopted children.19
However, with the Baby Boom generation reaching and passing
childbearing years in the 1970s, an influx of potential adopters
emerged." This emergence, in addition to women's changing belief that
single parenting was far better for the mother and the child21 likely aided
in the best home for the child becoming the ultimate goal.
A. Current Developments
In recent years, the "best interest of the child" has become quite
complicated. Severe social problems continue to grow in the United
States today, which directly impact the field of adoption.' Problems
such as teenage pregnancy, drug abuse, child abuse, and AIDS all
contribute more and more children each year into the foster care
system.23 Though these are tragic circumstances, adoption may be used
as a tool in transforming this adversity into prosperity. Also, with this
increase in children who are often labeled as hard-to-place, a variety of
other considerations come into play, such as, age, race, and physical and
mental health of the child.
One result of this influx of children was the 1984 Supreme Court
case of Palmore v. Sidoti, in which the court held that race could no
longer be a determinative factor in custody cases. 4 With this came an
increase in transracial adoptions. Today, adoptive families with mixed
racial heritage often refer to themselves as "rainbow families."" With
transracial adoption having become quite accepted, it is no longer
receiving as much attention. The hot topic now is not centered on the
children who are being adopted, but the parents who are doing the
adopting: gays and lesbians. However, unlike the Court's
denouncement of race as a factor in adoption proceedings, courts are
going the other way with gays and lesbians by proclaiming that
homosexuality is the determinative factor. This yields a disheartening
result.
18. Id. at xxvii.
19. See id. "To this date, black children are overrepresented in foster care, and they are
often the last to be adopted." Id.
20. See ADAMEC & PIERCE supra note 4, at xxx.
21. See id. at xxix.
22. See id. at xxxii.
23. See id.
24. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
25. See ADAMEC & PIERCE supra note 4, at 241.
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III. THE PROHIBITION OF ADOPTION BY HOMOSEXUALS
In the last twenty years, a scattering of prohibitions on adoption by
homosexuals has emerged. Courts are denying the adoption petitions of
gay and lesbian couples,' and legislatures are fostering statutory
amendments to adoption statutes which serve to preclude homosexuals
from becoming adoptive parents. This trend of regulation seems to be
continuing despite many well-founded arguments against it and a few
brave states that have either chosen to support it, or at the very least,
leave some room for discussion.
A. Statutory Prohibition
In 1977, the Florida legislature amended its adoption statute to
include the following provision, "No person eligible to adopt under this
statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual." 27 The general intent
of the Florida legislature is stated as, inter alia, "to protect.., the well-
being of persons being adopted.., and to provide.., a permanent
family life" for adopted children.' In 1997, the legislature went on to
profess its intent "to ensure the integrity of adoption."29 Though neither
of these statements make specific reference to the provision that
precludes any homosexual from adopting a child, the latter statement
was to be added to the section that discusses the legislative intent of the
adoption statute? The attempt to incorporate this wording may very
well have been in response to the 1995 Florida Supreme Court decision
of State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Cox.,3' in
26. The Supreme Court of Connecticut is the most recent court to speak to this issue.
On January 26, 1999, the court issued a lengthy opinion in response to a long line of appeals
that culminated in the denial of a lesbian couple's quest for joint, legal parenthood. See In re
Adoption of Baby Z, 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 1999). In its decision, the court recognized "that
all of the child care experts involved in [the] case... concluded that the proposed adoption
would be in Baby Z's best interest... [but b]ecause of the statutory nature of [the
Connecticut] adoption system, however, policy determinations as to what jurisdictional
limitations apply are for the legislature, not the judiciary, to make." 724 A.2d at 1060
(citations in original) (citations omitted). The Connecticut Supreme Court cites the
Wisconsin Supreme Court decision In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994), which
similarly denied a second-parent adoption, in support of its decision to narrowly construe the
adoption statute and to deny the adoption of Baby Z. See In re Baby Z, 724 A.2d 1035.
27. See Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1212; FL. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1997).
28. FL. STAT. ANN. § 63.022(1) (West 1997).
29. S. 1762, 15th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1997).
30. See id
31. 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995). In the Florida Supreme Court's denial to rehear the Cox
case, it effectively affirmed the lower court's holding that a categorical ban on homosexual
adoption is neither violative of the equal protection nor the due process clauses of the Florida
2000]
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order to augment what could be perceived as a somewhat capricious
denial of a "right"'32 to parent a child.
Recently, a number of states have attempted to follow the Florida
model in banning adoption by homosexuals. For example, in 1998 the
Alabama House of Representatives followed suit by adopting a joint
resolution "express[ing its] intent to prohibit child adoption by
homosexual couples., 33 From that statement of intent, the Alabama
Legislature proposed an amendment to its adoption statute that read,
"[a]ny adult person, who is not a homosexual, or husband and wife
jointly who are adults may petition the court to adopt a minor."' The
Alabama adoption statute, however, remains free of a prohibition on
homosexual adoption.35
In addition to Alabama, a number of state legislatures also sought to
prevent adoption by homosexuals in their respective states. In January
of 1997, the South Carolina Legislature proposed an amendment to its
adoption statute to prohibit any person "who is a homosexual or
bisexual" from petitioning the court to adopt a child.' However, the
South Carolina adoption statute remains free of this prohibition.37
Michigan proposed an amendment similar to that of South Carolina in
November of 1998.38 Yet, Michigan also remains free of a ban on
homosexual adoption.39
In the same vein, New Hampshire amended its adoption statute in
1987 to provide that, "any individual not a minor and not a homosexual
may adopt."' The New Hampshire House of Representatives drafted
this amendment after requesting an opinion from the Supreme Court of
or United States Constitutions.
32. I enclose the word "right" in quotation marks to set it off so the reader shall not
infer that I am assuming the right to become an adoptive parent is a "fundamental right"
under the Constitution. Though the Supreme Court has not stated so expressly, however
invidious it may seem, the State of Florida has agreed with the notion that the right to adopt a
child is not a fundamental right. See Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1216 ("[A]doption is not a right; it is a
statutory privilege" (citations omitted)); Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 24 (N.H. 1987).
33. H.R.J. Res. 35, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998).
34. H.R. 611, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998) (emphasis indicates amendment).
35. ALA. CODE § 26-10A-5 (1998).
36. H.R. 3179, 112th Sess. (S.C. 1997).
37. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1670 (Law. Co-op. 1998).
38. See H.R. 6236, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1998) ("A child shall not be placed with a
prospective adoptive parent and the court shall not issue an adoption order if a person
authorized to place the child or the court authorized to issue the order has reliable
information that the prospective adoptive parent is homosexual.").
39. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 710.22a (West 1998).
40. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (1997).
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New Hampshire as to the constitutional viability of House Bill 70,
which, inter alia, "prohibit[ed] homosexuals from adopting [children],"
and would, if enacted, amend the New Hampshire adoption statute to
preclude adoption by homosexuals. 41 In Opinion of the Justices, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court responded with a resounding stamp of
approval for the proposed legislation as it applied to adoption by
homosexuals.4 ' However, in May 1999, the New Hampshire Legislature
responded by enacting a provision that serves to remove "the
prohibition on adoption and foster parenting by homosexual persons."43
In 1999, there were a number of other states that sought to prohibit
homosexual men and women from adopting children. The Indiana
House of Representatives introduced a bill to deny homosexuals the
right to adopt, or to become foster parents of children.44 Texas
legislators also proposed a bill that would accomplish the same end by
prohibiting placement of a child "in an adoptive home in which
homosexual conduct occurs or is likely to occur., 45  In Arkansas,
Representative Minton proposed an amendment to Arkansas's adoption
statute that reads: "No person eligible to adopt under this statute may
adopt if that person is a homosexual."6 Finally, in Oklahoma,
legislators have proposed a bill that creates a Child Welfare System
Reform Committee whose duties include reviewing the Oklahoma
41. See Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21,21-23 (N.H. 1987).
42. See id. at 24-27.
(1) prospective application of [the] bill would not be violative of equal protection
clause of Federal or State Constitutions, regarding exclusion of homosexuals as
foster parents or adoptive parents; (2) bill as proposed would violate equal
protection clause of Federal and State Constitutions, as applied to day care centers;
(3) bill as proposed would not violate the due process clause of either Federal or
State Constitutions; and (4) bill would not violate any substantive right to privacy or
any right of freedom of association under either the Federal or State Constitutions.
Id.
43. H.R. 90, 156th Sess. (N.H. 1999) (enacted). In the wake of this enactment, a
legislative service request was filed on September 22, 1999 providing for a reinstatement of
the prohibition on adoption and foster parenting by homosexual persons. See LEGIS. SERV.
REG. 2012 (N.H. 1999).
44. See H.R. 1055, 111th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 1999).
45. See H.R. 382, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999). The Texas bill further ensures the
accomplishment of its goal of precluding an adoption by homosexuals by mandating an
"investigation to determine whether homosexual conduct is occurring or likely to occur in the
adoptive home." Id.
46. H.R. 2232,82nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1999).
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statutes and preparing recommendations for change. These
recommendations are to include the call for the "prohibiti[on of]
homosexuals from adopting children."'
B. A Challenge: State Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services v. Cox
In March of 1991, James W. Cox and Rodney M. Jackman attempted
to sign up for parenting classes at the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services (HRS) in Sarasota, Florida.49 Mr. Cox and Mr.
Jackman both voluntarily disclosed their homosexual orientation to
HRS."' Upon becoming aware of the fact that the two men resided at
the same address, HRS notified Mr. Cox and Mr. Jackman that it would
not accept, from either of them, an application to adopt a child pursuant
to § 63.042(3) of the Florida Statutes. 1 Section 63.042(3) provides that
"[n]o person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person
is a homosexual."
52
Mr. Cox and Mr. Jackman subsequently contacted the American
Civil Liberties Union and filed an action challenging § 63.042(3) arguing
that it was "unconstitutional on its face and as applied to them."53 The
basis of their complaint was that the statute was violative of both the
Equal Protection and substantive Due Process clauses of the Florida and
United States Constitutions and also that the statute impinged upon
their right to privacy.-' This Comment will focus on the equal protection
analysis in which the reviewing courts engaged.5
Mr. Cox and Mr. Jackman initially prevailed at the trial court level,
but were unsuccessful on appeal 6 The Florida Supreme Court followed
suit and denied their petition for certiorari. 7 The reversal of the trial
47. See H.R. 1280, 47th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 1999).
48. Id. at Section 4.A.6.h.
49. See State Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1212 (Fl.
Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1997).
53. Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1212.
54. See id.
55. Though all three bases of the plaintiffs' complaint are worthy of discussion, the equal
protection analysis engaged in by the court is what I find the most provocative and what I feel
may be the most closely scrutinized in view of the issues presented.
56. See Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1212.
57. See State Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Cox, 656 So.2d 902 (Fla.
1995).
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court was partially based on rejection of the plaintiffs' equal protection
argument.' Plaintiffs argued that the prohibition set forth in § 63.042(3)
of the Florida Statutes, which categorically forbids the class of
homosexuals from adopting children, is a denial of equal protection
under the Florida9  and United States Constitutions.6  Plaintiffs
submitted that homosexuality is a suspect class and should therefore be
subject to strict scrutiny review.
On the equal protection issue, the trial court concluded that the
statute was subject to strict scrutiny review and was, as a result of that
analysis, unconstitutional.6 The trial court based the bulk of its decision
on an unappealed decision from the Florida Circuit Court that held §
63.042(3) invalid as violative of the state and federal constitutions.6 The
court of appeals reversed, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to
establish a basis for strict scrutiny review.6
In its decision, the Florida appellate court relied heavily on the fact
that within the federal realm, "neither homosexual orientation nor
homosexual conduct has been determined to be a class requiring strict
scrutiny review."'' The court found additional support for its denial of
strict scrutiny review by analogizing the case of In re Florida Board of
Bar Examiners,6 which concerned the possible denial of homosexuals to
the Florida Bar.67 Because the Bar Examiners court concluded that the
exclusion of homosexuals from the bar did not bear any rational relation
to a person's ability to perform as a competent attorney, the Cox court
58. See Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1218-20.
59. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("All natural persons are equal before the law...
60. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (No state "shall... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
61. "[S]trict scrutiny [review is required] of a legislative classification only when the
classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to
the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307,312 (1976) (citations omitted).
62. See Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1212.
63. See Seebol v. Farie, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C52 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1991). Seebol was not a
published opinion, but its text may be found at Appendix A of the District Court of Appeals
Decision of Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1221.
64. See Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1219.
65. Id. (citations omitted).
66. 358 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1978). In this case the Florida Board of Bar Examiners requested
guidance from the Florida Supreme Court regarding a recent applicant who had revealed a
homosexual orientation upon applying for admission to the bar. See id. The applicant was
fully qualified for admission "in all respects with the possible exception that he may fail to
meet the 'good moral character' standard for admission due to his homosexual preference."
Id. at 8.
67. See id.
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presumed that same rational basis test should apply with regard to
would-be adoptive parents who are homosexual.6 After engaging in an
extensive equal protection analysis, the Cox court concluded that §
63.042(3) was well within the range of the Florida Legislature's public
policy decision-making powers.69 Citing the narrowness of rational basis
review, the court deferred to the legislature and recognized that "[t]he
state clearly has a legitimate governmental purpose in seeking to
provide for the best interests of children in need of adoption."70 The
court essentially adopted the argument set forth by HRS that
heterosexual adoptive parents will serve as better role models to
adopted children, and thus, the ban on homosexual adoption promotes
the government interest of the best interest of the child .
1. The State Interest
In Cox, the court concluded that "[t]he state clearly has a legitimate
governmental purpose in seeking to provide for the best interests of the
68. In denying plaintiffs' claim, the court relies on a number of cases that hold that
homosexual orientation does not warrant strict scrutiny review. See Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d
1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 1991); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d
563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 463 (7th Cir. 1989).
69. See Cox, 627 So.2d 1220.
70. Id.
71. Id. The court summarized the argument in support of the ban on adoption by
homosexuals as follows:
[W]hatever causes a person to become a homosexual, it is clear that the state cannot
know the sexual preferences that a child will exhibit as an adult. Statistically, the
state does know that a very high percentage of children available for adoption will
develop heterosexual preferences. As a result, those children will need education
and guidance after puberty concerning relationships with the opposite sex. In our
society, we expect that parents will provide this education to teenagers in the home.
These subjects are often very embarrassing for teenagers and some aspects of the
education are accomplished by the parents telling stories about their own
adolescence and explaining their own experiences with the opposite sex. It is in the
best interests of a child if his or her parents can personally relate to the child's
problems and assist the child in the difficult transition to heterosexual adulthood.
Given that adopted children tend to have some developmental problems arising
from adoption or from their experiences prior to adoption, it is perhaps more
important for adopted children than other children to have a stable heterosexual
household during puberty and the teenage years. Without reliance upon any
unsubstantiated notion that a parent could "teach" a child to become a homosexual,
HRS maintains that the legislature may still decide that the best interests of children
require that they be adopted by persons who can and will serve as heterosexual role
models.
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child in need of adoption." While this is clearly a legitimate end of the
legislature, the means it employs to achieve it are counterintuitive. By
categorically banning any and all homosexuals from having access to the
possibility of becoming a parent, and thereby providing a home to a
wanting child, the legislature is systematically reducing the chances of
parentless children of ever being adopted. How can this be in the "best
interest of the child"? Yet, HRS continues to argue "that the legislature
can rationally decide that this governmental purpose is promoted by a
total prohibition of adoptions by homosexuals." 74
The Florida appellate court agreed with HRS and reversed the
decision of the trial court that had originally found for Mr. Cox. and Mr.
Jackman. At the initial trial, the court rejected HRS's argument and
assented to that of the plaintiffs, who relied predominantly on another
circuit court decision that declared § 63.042(3) unconstitutional and also
adopted the theories and research which generally set forth the
proposition that gays and lesbians would clearly be suitable adoptive
parents.75 The court rejected the plaintiffs' reliance and concluded that
they failed "to overcome the presumption of [the] constitutionality" of
the statute.
2. Equal Protection and the Minimum Rationality Standard
In its analysis, the Cox court utilized the minimum rationality, or
rational basis, standard of review.' Under a rational basis analysis,
almost any statute will pass constitutional muster since great deference
72. Id.
73. See infra note 144.
74. Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1219.
75. See Seebol v. Farie, 16 F. L. Weekly C52 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1991) (reprinted in Cox, 627
So. 2d at App. A, 1222).
76. Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1220. See supra notes 65-71, and accompanying text for the
court's reasons for concluding that plaintiffs failed to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality.
77. In one of the earliest equal protection cases heard by the United States Supreme
Court, Chief Justice Warren clearly spelled out the goal of the rational basis inquiry when he
stated in McGowan v. Maryland, that:
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are
presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in
practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be
set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
366 U.S. 420,425-26 (1961) (citations omitted).
2000]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
is given to the legislature and its purported ability to craft statutes that
employ means that are "reasonably related" to a legitimate state end.78
The court asserts that it achieves this reasonable relation by its
argument, stated in pertinent part, that "[i]t is in the best interest of a
child if his or her parents can personally relate to the child's problems
and assist the child in the difficult transition to heterosexual
adulthood., 79 Though this is somewhat persuasive, evidence indicates
that this no better furthers the state's interest of the best interest of the
child than does a stable, loving, and supportive gay or lesbian parent.,0
Can a state really purport to be acting in the best interest of its children
when it enacts a statute that is so patently overinclusive as to include, for
example, a gay man who wishes to adopt a mentally and physically
handicapped little boy who would otherwise likely remain either in
foster care or in an institution for the rest of his life?8' Evidently, if a
court can adopt an argument based on pure conjecture and nothing
more, situations such as this will be the ultimate result.
IV. DEFENDING ADOPTION BY HOMOSEXUALS
In contrast to the prohibitive statutes that are now in force, there are
also a number of states that legally recognize adoption by homosexuals.
The following are cases wherein courts granted petitions for adoption by
homosexuals. While many of the reviewing courts merely interpret the
existing statute as to whether adoption by a homosexual is a statutory
possibility under current construction of the statue,' there are some
states that have expressly sanctioned adoption by homosexuals.
A. The Cases
The Supreme Court of Ohio was one of the first courts to offer an
affirmative answer to the question of whether a homosexual ought to be
allowed to adopt.83 In March of 1990, the court granted a single
78. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 635-36 (13th ed. 1997).
79. Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1220.
80. See infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text concerning the parenting skills of
homosexuals.
81. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text for a case such as the one described.
82. This type of analysis is quite dissimilar to that in Cox. 627 So. 2d 1210. The Cox
Court was burdened with the task of determining the constitutionality of a prohibitive statute
that was already in existence, whereas these courts are able to engage in an analysis to
determine whether adoption by homosexuals could conceivably be read into the scope of the
statute.
83. See id.
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homosexual male's (Mr. B) petition to adopt an eight-year-old mentally
and physically handicapped boy named Charles.4 The court found that
Mr. B clearly fell within the scope of the Ohio adoption statute that
provides in pertinent part: "The following persons may adopt: ... [a]n
unmarried adult."' The court then went on to hold that "adoption
matters must be decided on a case-by-case basis through the able
discretion [of] the trial court giving due consideration to all known
factors in determining what is in the best interest of the person to be
adopted."'
In applying this standard, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that
the trial court was correct in its determination that it was in Charles's
best interest to be adopted by Mr. B.8 In its decision, the supreme court
cited several reasons for its conclusion, including that Charles had
undergone a very unstable and abusive childhood, and that since 1986,
when Mr. B first met Charles, "Mr. B has been the one consistent and
caring person in the life of Charles B." The court also recognized that
at trial, Mr. B provided six witnesses to testify on his behalf; whereas his
opponent, the County Department of Human Services, put forth one
woman who had no formal education relative to this decision and stated
that the sole reason for denial of his application was that Mr. B "did not
meet [the Department's] 'characteristic profile of preferred adoptive
placement."' As a result, the Ohio Supreme Court granted Mr. B's
petition for adoption with relative indifference to the fact that he is
homosexual and relying solely on the "best interest of the child" for
guidance.90
84. See In re Adoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1990).
85. See id. at 886; OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 3107.03(B) (West 1996).
86. In re Adoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d at 886.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 885.
89. Id. at 888.
90. Id. In its decision, the Ohio Supreme Court references an earlier decision wherein
the court of appeals reversed an adoption agency's decision to deny an adoption petition
because of the advanced age of the parties. I believe the sentiment expressed in the following
quote is similarly applicable to the issue presented in this Comment.
Obviously, a "structured" agency system taking into account many factors before
giving consent to adoption as urged by the professionals is of great importance...,
but few standards in human affairs can be procrustean in application. In the light of
the total evidence, and the singular emphasis on age as the key factor in denying
consent, the denial in this case seems an example of a loss of the spirit of the whole
adoption system while holding to the letter of part of it. The fault, the
unreasonableness, the arbitrariness and the caprice, lie precisely with this
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On January 30, 1992, two years after the Ohio Supreme Court's
Decision in In re Adoption of Charles B., the Surrogate's Court of New
York County, New York granted one of the first petitions for a second-
parent adoption by a lesbian." Petitioner, Diane F., sought to adopt six-
year-old Evan, the biological son of her lesbian partner who was
artificially inseminated pursuant to their joint decision to become
mothers.2 The following year, a number of states, including New
Jersey,93 Vermont, 94 and Massachusetts,95 joined New York in accepting
the adoption petitions of potential lesbian mothers. As with the
adoption of Evan, the three cases decided in 1993 all involved women
who were artificially inseminated. As such, the children at issue in the
adoption were essentially born into their "adoptive" families. This casts
quite a different light on the current debate concerning whether it is
good public policy to engage in the practice of actually placing children
in adoptive homes where the parents are of a homosexual orientation-
perhaps the appropriate policy discussion should center on adoptions
similar to the adoption of Evan.
Consistent with the preceding year, in January of 1994 the family
court of Monroe County, New York went on to find in favor of two
more lesbian families seeking to adopt the biological children of their
partners. 96 The four children at issue were all products of artificial
insemination. Similarly, in December of 1994, the Family Court of
Kings County, New York granted the petition for the adoption of
Camilla Joanne Y.-B., who would subsequently be adopted by her
biological mother's lesbian partner.97
In each of the aforementioned decisions, one of the principal points
extraordinary emphasis on a single negative factor in the face of remarkably
unanimous opinion that by all other standards the appellees are outstandingly
qualified to be adoptive parents.
Id. at 889 (quoting In re Haun, 286 N.E.2d 478, 482-483 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972) (emphasis in
original)).
91. See Matter of Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1992).
92. See id. at 998.
93. See In re Adoption by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). New
Jersey's most recent case sanctioning same-sex adoption was in 1995 when the appellate
division of the superior court granted a lesbian woman's petition to adopt the biological twins
of her partner. See In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1995).
94. See Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
95. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993).
96. See In re Adoption of Caitlin, 622 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Fam. Ct. Monroe Co. N.Y. 1994).
97. See In re Matter of Camilla, 620 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Fam. Ct. Kings Co. N.Y. 1994).
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of discussion is the predicament that arises in the context of adoptions
by same-sex couples: the termination of the parental rights of the
biological parent." The consensus among the states that have approved
these adoptions, is to read an adoption by a same-sex parent into the
"step-parent exception" of the statute that sets forth the effect of
adoption." Though this exception may seem to be applicable solely
because one of the parents is indeed the biological parent, this is not the
case. For example, in 1995, the District of Columbia joined the ranks of
the sanctioning states when it permitted Mark D., a gay male, to join his
partner, Bruce M., as Baby Hillary's second adoptive father."l In so
doing, the court of appeals analogized Mark and Bruce's life partnership
to that of a married couple and concluded that although Bruce is not
Hillary's biological parent, their joint caring for her as their child is
sufficient to include them within the scope of the step-parent
exception.'1
Though the New York decisions cited above emanate from lower
courts, in 1995, the highest court of New York voiced its approval of the
lower decisions in In re Jacob by announcing that the statutory language
in Domestic Relations Law § 110 permits unwed couples to adopt
children.'02 In re Jacob consisted of a combination of two appeals: the
first concerned an unmarried heterosexual couple and, the second was
98. Most adoption statutes have a provision that mandates the termination of the
parental rights of the birth parent upon adoption of the child. In the context of adoptions by
homosexuals this presents a significant problem. For example, if a woman wants to adopt her
lesbian partner's biological child to become that child's second-parent, under the typical
statute the biological mother will have to forfeit her legal rights as the child's mother. This is
similarly applicable to two homosexual males who seek to parent a child together. Not only
are the legal rights of the parent at issue, but questions of inheritance arise in the event of the
death of the second parent. For further discussion on this dilemma, see Ralph C. Brahier,
Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 93 (1996); Ralph
C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83 (1994);
Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16 LAw
& INEQ. J. 1 (1998); Emily McAllister, Defining the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of
Reproductive Technology: Implications for Inheritance, 29 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 55
(1994); Laura M. Padilla, Flesh of my Flesh but not My Heir: Unintended Disinheritance, 36
BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 219 (1997-98).
99. See In re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 321; In re Adoption of a Child by
J.M.G., 632 A.2d at 552-53; In re Adoption of Caitlin, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 837-40; In re Adoption
of Camilla, 620 N.Y.S.2d 900-03; In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1000-01; Adoptions
of B.L. V.B. and E.L. V.B., 628 A.2d at 1273-75.
100. See In re M.M.D. & B.H.M, 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995).
101. See id. at 860.
102. See In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995).
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that of an unmarried homosexual couple.1" The problem the lower
courts encountered was the language in § 110 of the state's Domestic
Relations Law. '  Section 110 provided that "[a]n adult unmarried
person or an adult husband and his adult wife together may adopt
another person." ' 5 Presumably, the drafters intent was to ensure that
single men and women would be eligible in the eyes of the law to adopt
children. However, unmarried couples (both heterosexual and
homosexual) saw this as a legal loophole through which they could
achieve their goal of becoming parents.'°6
With the increasingly intense debate on whether homosexual men
and women should be granted the privilege to become parent, the Jacob
Court surprisingly spends little time in addressing this concern. After
concluding that both couples indeed have standing to adopt under § 110,
it quickly shifts gears to address the termination of parental rights issue
posed by § 117 of the Domestic Relations Law.'" The court disposes
with this issue as quickly as the first in concluding that only a "[1]iteral
application of this language would effectively prevent these adoptions
since it would require the termination of the biological mother's right
upon adoption thereby placing appellants in the 'Catch-22' of having to
choose one of two coparents as the child's only legal parent."', In
opting for a "common sense"'1' interpretation of the statute, the court
103. See id. at 398. The unmarried heterosexual couple consisted of Steven K. and
Roseanne M.A. See id. At the lower court level, Steven K. was precluded from adopting
Jacob, the biological child of Roseanne M.A. See id. Both Jacob and Roseanne resided with
Steven since early 1991. See id. G.M. and P.I. made up the homosexual couple, wherein the
lesbian partner (G.M.) of Dana's biological mother was precluded from petitioning to adopt
Dana. See id. At the time of this decision, G.M. and P.I. had been in a relationship for
nineteen years and made the joint decision in 1989 that P.I. would be artificially inseminated
so that they could become parents. See id. at 398. P.I. gave birth to Dana in 1990, and in
1993, with P.I.'s consent, G.M. filed a petition to adopt Dana. See id.
104. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1998).
105. Id.
106. See Jan Hoffman, Unmarried Couples Challenging State Law Barring Their
Adoption Plans, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1995, at B5.
107. Section 117(1)(a) of the Domestic Relations Law provides in relevant part that
"[a]fter the making of an order of adoption the natural parents of the adoptive child shall be
relieved of all parental duties toward and of all responsibilities for and shall have no rights
over such adoptive child or to his property by descent or succession ... " N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW. § 117(1)(a) (McKinney 1998).
108. In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 401.
109. In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 405, n.8. This notion of a "common sense" interpretation
of a statute concerning termination of parental rights was first set forth in Adoption of
B.L. V.B. and E.L. V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1274 (Vt. 1993). In reference to Vermont's statute,
Justice Johnson of the Virginia Supreme Court explained:
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grants the adoptions and thus reaches its holding that unmarried
couples, both heterosexual and homosexual may adopt.
Unlike a number of other cases granting homosexual adoption
petitions, the Jacob court virtually sidesteps the concurrent issue of
whether homosexuals should be precluded from adopting on the basis of
their sexual orientation. This court is unique from the others in that it
truly focuses in on the "best interest of the child." It essentially defers
to the lower courts' analyses in the cases of In re Adoption of Evan"'
and In re Adoption of Camilla"' and their conclusion that a court may
not reject prospective adoptive parents "'solely on the basis of
homosexuality."'. The sentiment of the Jacob court may be
summarized in one simple phrase of Chief Judge Kaye's opinion: that
"granting appellants.., standing to adopt [is] therefore consistent with
the words of the statute as well as the spirit behind the modern-day
[adoption] amendments: [which is] encouraging the adoption of as
many children as possible regardless of the sexual orientation or marital
status of the individuals seeking to adopt them.""'
When the statute is read as a whole, we see that its general purpose is to clarify and
protect the legal rights of the adopted person at the time the adoption is complete,
not to proscribe adoptions by certain combinations of individuals. Who may adopt
is already covered... [this section] is concerned with defining the lines of
inheritance for adoptees, preserving their right to inherit from their natural parents
and granting the right to inherit from the "person or persons" by whom they are
adopted. The statute also terminates the natural parents' rights upon adoption, but
this provision anticipates that the adoption of children will remove them from the
home of the biological parents, where the biological parents elect or are compelled
to terminate their legal obligations to the child. This legislative intent is evidenced
by the step-parent exception, which saves the natural parent's rights in a step-parent
adoption. The legislature recognized that it would be against common sense to
terminate the biological parent's rights when that parent will continue to raise and
be responsible for the child, albeit in a family unit with a partner who is biologically
unrelated to the child.
Id. (emphasis added). The Jacob court also emphasized that "the adoption statute must be
applied in harmony with the humanitarian principle that adoption is a means of securing the
best possible home for a child." In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 399.
110. See 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1992).
111. 620 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Fam. Ct. Monroe Co. N.Y. 1994).
112. Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1002; Camilla, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 900 (quoting 18 N.Y.C.R.R.
421.16(h)(2)).
113. In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 401.
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B. Rebutting the Presumption
Throughout the past decade, both legal and psychosocial
development scholars have devoted a considerable amount of time to
assessing the legitimacy of the claim that homosexuals would not make
good parents. The overwhelming majority of these scholars have come
to the conclusion that this claim is unsupported."" Thus, it is relatively
inexplicable that with this persuasive research and the appearance of
gays and lesbians becoming increasingly more accepted in today's
society, we are still seeing the exercise of restraint from state legislatures
that have chosen to enact all-out bans on homosexuals who wish to
adopt children.' As we saw in Cox,"6 gays are fighting a losing battle
when it comes to challenging the statutes that categorically ban gay
adoption. However, in states that have statutes that simply provide that
"an unmarried adult" may adopt, gay and lesbian couples are often
victorious."7
Courts that grant these petitions for adoption are often persuaded by
research advanced by plaintiffs and conclude that it is indeed in the
"best interest of the child" to grant the adoption. Conversely, though no
applicable statute banning homosexual adoption is in force, some courts
will disregard favorable research and empirical evidence that the
adoption is in "the best interest of the child" and nevertheless deny the
adoption petition. Alternatively, other courts reason that the adoption
cannot go forward because of a glitch in the adoption statute that
mandates the termination of the parental rights of the biological
parent.' As evidenced by a number of decisions, this parental rights
termination problem may be sidestepped by invoking the "step-parent
exemption"'' 9 in order to allow the adoption to proceed. However, it
appears as though the courts declining to take this route are simply
resting on the argument that the text of the statute ought to be strictly
construed, and with that strict construction, the inescapable conclusion
is that the petition must be denied in order to preserve the legal rights of
114. See infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text.
115. I use the word "inexplicable" because it is my understanding that the role of courts
and legislatures is to make conclusions based on tangible evidence, not personal biases. It
seems apparent that a large number of the courts that reject these would-be adoptive parents
claims, have probably made their decisions before even hearing the case.
116. 627 So. 2d 1210. (Fla. 1993).
117. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 26.
119. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
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the biological mother1 2
The courts that disavow potential homosexual adoptive parents and
the legislatures that enact or seek to enact prohibitive legislation may be
doing so in an effort to please the public. As evidenced by a recent
public opinion poll in the Indianapolis Star, public perception of
homosexuality remains laden with negativity."' However, to defend the
public, this negative perception is likely due to a lack of accurate
information. To remedy some of these misconceptions, much scholarly
research and study in the psychological, sociological, and legal fields has
been conducted.
1. Effect of Parent's Homosexuality on Child's Sexual Orientation
The assumption that homosexual adoptive parents will somehow
make their children homosexual is a fallacy. Research shows that "the
incidence of same-sex orientation among the children of gays and
lesbians occurs as randomly and in the same proportion as it does
among children in the general population; as they grow up, children
adopt sexual orientations independently from their parents. ' ' 2
This assumption that homosexual parents will make their children
homosexual likely stems from the earlier presumptions that
homosexuals were deviant and that homosexuality was a mental
disorder1 2 However, in 1973 the American Psychiatric Association
made a move toward dispelling this assumption by removing
homosexuality from its list of mental disorders." The American
Psychological Association soon followed when in 1975 it adopted the
resolution that "homosexuality per se implies no impairment in
judgment, stability, reliability of general social and vocational
capabilities." ''
120. See supra note 26.
121. See Friday Forum Topic: Gay Adoptions. Indianapolis Star, Oct. 9, 1998, at A23.
The letters received by readers in response to the "Friday Forum" topic on gay adoptions are
quite significant in that some represent the most common concerns addressed by researchers,
and presumably the most common concerns of the national citizenry as well. This question
was posed in response to the pending Indiana Bill to categorically ban homosexual adoptions.
See supra note 44.
122. Steve Susoeff, Assessing Children's Best Interests When a Parent is Gay or Lesbian:
Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852, 882 (1985).
123. See Elizabeth D. Gibbs, Psychosocial Development of Children Raised by Lesbian
Mothers: A Review of Research, 8 WOMEN & THERAPY 65, 66 (1988).
124. See id.
125. See id. (citations omitted). For further discussion of this inquiry, see Richard
Green, M.D., The Best Interests of the Child with a Lesbian Mother, 10 BULL. OF THE AAPL
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With the knowledge that homosexuality is not an exercise in deviant
activity, it could still be suggested that homosexuality may be a learned
behavior. If this were true, critics of homosexual adoption would have
somewhat of a basis for their complaint. However, research indicates
that homosexuality is probably more of an inborn characteristic.'26 It has
been suggested that the best guess of the cause of homosexual
orientation is that it is genetic.127 It follows that a parent who is
homosexual is not likely to influence a child's sexual development.
Moreover, most critics of homosexual adoption fail to realize that
though many homosexual men and women are seeking to adopt
children, it is not their goal to "convert" these children to the other
side.'" In response to this contention, Dr. Richard Green comments on
his discussions with lesbian mothers:
I ask the lesbian mother about her feelings regarding the
emerging sexuality of her child and whether she would like her
child to be homosexual or heterosexual. The usual response is,
"I would like my child to be happy." If I press one step beyond,
many mothers will say, "Well, I guess all other things being
equal, in this society, it would be easier if he (or she) is
heterosexual." Then I ask: "For a moment I would like you to
assume that you would like to have your child turn out to be
homosexual, and I would like you to tell me how you would go
about doing that." I have yet to obtain a plan. Indeed, this lack
is honest because no one really knows how to raise a child to be
homosexual. We are not certain how to raise a child to be
heterosexual.' 29
Thus, one may properly infer that gay and lesbian parents do not
7, 9-10.
126. See Green, supra note 125, at 7. The theory of a genetic basis is evidenced by the
Kallman study which compared 39 pairs of monozygotic male twins (presumably "identical"
twins) as to their sexual orientation. See id. (citing F. Kallman, Comparative Twin Study on
the Genetic Aspects of Male Homosexuality, 115 J. NERV. MENT. DIs. 283-298 (1952)).
Kallman selected 39 males, who were predominantly or exclusively homosexual, and then
compared each with his twin. See id. For each pair, "the co-twin was also found to be
predominantly or exclusively homosexual. This suggests, at the very least, some contribution
from genetics." Id.
127. See id.
128. See Susoeff, supra note 122, at 880 n.180 (citing J. FALLWELL, LISTEN, AMERICA!
160 (1980) ("Homosexuals cannot reproduce themselves, so they must recruit .... Why must
they prey upon our young?")).
129. See Green, supra note 125, at 11.
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cause their children to become homosexual.
2. Effect of Parent's Homosexuality on Child's Identity
Though it is relatively conclusive that a parent's homosexuality will
not have a detrimental effect on a child's sexual orientation, the
question remains whether that child will experience developmental
problems with regard to his or her identity. In response to this question,
"the general consensus among researchers is that children raised by
lesbian mothers develop an appropriate gender identity [and] follow
typical developmental patterns of acquiring sex role concepts and sex-
typed behaviors .... "" This conclusion is further supported in that "no
consistent pattern of personality traits has been found to characterize
homosexual individuals. 13
3. Resultant Teasing of Child with a Homosexual Parent
Another common concern of critics of homosexual adoption is that
children of homosexual parents will be stigmatized and subject to
increased teasing and ridicule from their peers as a result.'32 Though this
fear is proven to be relatively unfounded, there are some exceptions.33
The research in this area is somewhat limited; however, one study
concluded that "only about five percent of the children studied who had
lived with an openly gay or lesbian parent had been harassed by other
children."' '3 Another study of eighteen children being raised in seven
lesbian parent families noted that only three of those children reported
teasing.' 35 The episodes mentioned consisted of minimal verbal teasing
such as, "Your mother is a lezzie"-to which the reply was, "So what!' ' 36
130. Gibbs, supra note 123, at 70; see also Mark E. Elovitz, Adoption by Lesbian and
Gay People: The Use and Mis-Use of Social Science Research, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & PoL'Y
207, 212 n.24 ("[T]he gender identity of children raised by a lesbian mother does not differ
from the gender identity of children raised by a heterosexual mother."); David K. Flaks, Gay
and Lesbian Families: Judicial Assumptions, Scientific Realities 3 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS.
J. 345, 364-65 (review of research indicates no inappropriate gender identity in comparison of
children living in lesbian and heterosexual-mother homes).
131. Gibbs supra note 123, at 67.
132. See Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption of Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults:
A Social Science Perspective, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 191 (1995).
133. See Elovitz, supra note 130, at 215.
134. Susoeff, supra note 122, at 877. (citing research results listed in Brian Miller, Gay
Fathers and Their Children, 28 FAM. COORDINATOR 544,548 (1979)).
135. See Richard Green, M.D., Sexual Identity of 37 Children Raised by Homosexual or
Transsexual Parents, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 692,695 (1978).
136. Id.
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This matter-of-fact type of reaction was characteristic-as was
obliviousness. 
137
Despite this mention of teasing of children who are raised by
homosexual parents, this finding neglects to account for the customary
teasing many children of heterosexual households submit to each day.
Lest we forget, children can be cruel, regardless of what type of
background a person has. Though the fact that a child has a lesbian or
gay parent may provide an additional motive to harass, this will
probably not turn an ordinarily amicable child into a bully. Moreover, it
is essentially the self-esteem and confidence a child possesses, or lack
thereof, that will ultimately lead to his or her warding off, or succumbing
to harassment by other children.' For whatever reason a child is
teased, provided that it is not excessive,139 he or she is best equipped to
deal with it if he or she is being raised by compassionate, supportive
parents, regardless of the parents' sexual orientation.
4. Parenting Skills of Homosexual Parents
The degree of distaste to the prospect of homosexual adoption
exhibited by courts and the public is quite remarkable when viewed in
comparison with research that indicates that "[n]o study has shown any
harm to children raised by lesbian or gay parents." ' 40 However, some
judges continue to base their decisions on an unsupported belief that
homosexual relationships are abnormal and lack stability.141  This
presumption then leads them to infer that detrimental effects on the
children will result.14
2
As stated above, there is absolutely no evidence to show that
homosexual parents are lacking in any way.14 1 In fact, research suggests
137. See id.
138. See Gibbs, supra note 123, at 71-72 (acknowledging that "[i]t is likely that 'lesbian
mothers who had accepted their own homosexuality could help their children with conflicts in
the neighborhood in a healthy, tolerant way, just as Jewish mothers could help their children
cope with anti-Semitism-because they did not feel guilty about being Jewish."') (citation
omitted).
139. "[G]ay rights' advocates acknowledge that intense anti-gay prejudice can justify
denial of custody in individual cases where children have actually suffered harassment and
choose not to live with a gay or lesbian parent." Susoeff, supra note 122, at 877-78. (citations
omitted).
140. Elovitz, supra note 130, at 211.
141. See Flaks, supra note 130, at 351.
142 See id.
143. For a selection of inspiring stories of successful gay and lesbian families see
LESBIAN AND GAY FOSTERING AND ADOPTION (Stephen Hicks & Janet McDermott, eds.,
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that lesbian and gay parents fare equally to, if not better than,
heterosexual parents when judged in terms of parenting skills."' Studies
conducted on lesbian mothers conclusively show "a remarkable absence
of distinguishing features between the life-styles, child-rearing practices,
and general demographic data of lesbian mothers and heterosexual
mothers." '145 Another study shows that lesbian mothers show more
concern for their children's long-term development as compared to
heterosexual mothers as a group.'" In terms of gay and non-gay fathers,
the research suggests that there are "no discernible differences in
parenting style" and also "that the two groups of men shared a similar
development orientation toward their role as fathers."'1 47
While these results appear conclusive, as evidenced by legislatures'
continuing attempts to categorically ban adoption by homosexuals,'4 the
message is simply not getting through. Courts and legislatures need to
take this research into consideration before issuing another decision, or
enacting another law, that will deprive so many children of a new
mother or father simply on the basis of their homosexuality.
C. A New Standard
The fact remains that there are, as of November 1998, approximately
100,000 children currently in foster care in the United States who are
awaiting permanent placement in adoptive homes.4 9 Though there are
no statistics available on the number of gay and lesbian people who have
sought or have succeeded in adoption,"'o as evidenced by the number of
recent cases challenging denied petitions, 5' there are undoubtedly many
more prospective parents waiting in the wings. Yet, with the relatively
uncertain state of the law, it would not be surprising to hear that
homosexuals at all interested in adopting children would seek to keep
their sexual orientation to themselves in order to have an adoption
petition approved. This, however, is exactly what should not be
happening.
1999).
144. See Elovitz, supra note 130, at 211.
145. Id.
146. See id. (citations omitted).
147. Id. (citations omitted).
148. See supra notes 27-48 and accompanying text.
149. See President Directs HHS to Develop Plan for Using Internet to Increase
Adoptions, 25 BNA REP. 1058 (Dec. 1, 1998).
150. See Elovitz, supra note 130, at 209.
151. See supra notes 83-113 and accompanying text.
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It appears as though children who are raised by homosexual parents
are happiest when their parents are at ease about their homosexuality.'
Forcing would-be adoptive parents to hide their homosexuality in order
to progress through the rigors of an adoption agency's screening process
would simply be counterintuitive. It would only emphasize the need to
hide who you truly are to a child who, in all likelihood, already feels at
home.
In addition to the number of children in the United States in need of
permanent homes, and the large number of prospective parents who are
being systematically prohibited from having the opportunity to adopt
these children, there is yet another reason to open the doors to adoption
for gays and lesbians. The Uniform Adoption Act specifically provides
in a prefatory note that "[n]o one may be categorically excluded from
being considered as an adoptive parent."'53
Though it may appear that I am attempting to argue that being
raised in a homosexual household would be entirely equivalent to being
raised in a heterosexual household, that is not my intent. It would be
naive to infer such to be true. My intent is to convey to judges and law-
makers that while growing up with a homosexual parent or parents
would, without a doubt be different, it would not necessarily be adverse.
The latter is the presumption that many courts and legislatures have
taken.
This Comment proposes that a new standard be set in guiding
decision-making procedures with regard to homosexuals seeking to
adopt children. In accordance with the true "best interest of the child,"
this Comment submits that a new variance of this standard be
implemented wherein the sexual orientation of the prospective adoptive
15Z See supra notes 135 & 138.
153. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT Prefatory Note (5), 9 Part 1A U.L.A. 14 (1994). The
Prefatory Note of the Uniform Adoption Act begins with the following statement that should
be taken into consideration by judges and lawmakers who will ultimately decide whether
homosexuals will be permitted to adopt.
The guiding principle of the Uniform Adoption Act is a desire to promote the
welfare of children and, particularly, to facilitate the placement of minor children
who cannot be raised by their original parents with adoptive parents who can offer
them stable and loving homes. The Act is premised on a belief that adoption offers
significant legal, economic, social and psychological benefits not only for children
who might otherwise be homeless, but also for parents who are unable to care for
their children, for adults who want to nurture and support children, and for state
governments ultimately responsible for the well-being of children.
Id. at 12.
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parent shall be considered only when there is another prospective
adoptive parent. This new standard will ensure that the "best interest of
the child" is in fact the quintessential determinant in adoptive
placement.
V. CONCLUSION
Through this review of history, statutory law, caselaw, and scholarly
research, it is indeed evident that a clearer, more succinct standard in
judging the prospect of adoption by homosexuals is a necessity. The
standard this Comment suggests should lead the way to decisions which
truly advance the "best interest of the child."
Jurisdictions that base their decisions on the statutorily mandated
termination of parental rights could feasibly override this glitch in the
statute by adopting the proposed standard as a resolution of the
legislature. In doing so, the need to defer to the strict construction of
the statute would be eliminated-and petitions that are denied even
though the adoption would be in the child's best interest would be an
injustice of the past.1'
Regardless of a legislator's or judge's preconceived notion that
homosexuality is wrong-the bottom line must still be the "best interest
of the child." How can one maintain a straight face and claim that
instituting an all-out ban on adoptions by homosexuals is furthering the
state's interest, when in effect, all this is doing is keeping more children
in foster care; or in the case of second-parent adoptions, denying a child
the right to have two legal parents.
The answer is simple. For the law to protect the "best interest of the
child," lawmakers must change the errors of their ways. Opening
adoption up to potential gay and lesbian parents is a step in the right
direction.
HEATHER J. LANGEMAK
154. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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